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vent “unwarranted human suffering” (p. 34). But this duty is wider than 
the duty to prevent violations of dignity, for, Perry expressly says, some 
forms of “unwarranted human suffering” do not violate human dignity. 
How a moral system based on human dignity entails a duty to prevent 
certain actions that do not violate that dignity Perry never explains. Argu-
ments like this do much of the work in this part of the book.
As to the proper role of courts in protecting human rights, Perry argues 
that unelected judges can protect such rights better than elected legisla-
tors or executive officers because judges are more insulated from popular 
influence. This argument goes back at least to The Federalist. Perry then re-
fers to the counter-majoritarian difficulty, the idea that judicial review is 
suspect because allowing unelected judges the final say on the validity of 
legislation is anti-democratic. He argues for a compromise solution that al-
lows courts to invalidate legislation but also allows legislatures to overrule 
courts by following special super-majoritarian procedures. Such compro-
mises between unfettered democracy and judicial supremacy have been 
discussed in the literature for many years, and Perry provides illuminating 
accounts of the compromise systems in Canada and the United Kingdom. 
Finally, Perry argues that when, as in the United States, courts have the 
last word and amending the constitution is usually impracticable, courts 
should declare legislation unconstitutional only if there is no reasonable 
reading of the constitutional text under which such legislation would be 
valid—a position famously developed by Thayer. Perry applies Thayerian 
principles to conclude that the Supreme Court should find that capital pun-
ishment, laws banning abortions, and a state’s refusal to recognize same-
sex unions are all constitutional. Given Perry’s moral views on these issues, 
this section of the book is an impressive display of intellectual integrity.
In sum, the problems that infect Perry’s use of the word “dignity” 
ripple throughout his philosophical discussions in this book, and Perry’s 
argument that religious theories have an advantage over non-religious 
theories in supporting the morality of human rights is not persuasive. His 
discussion of the law of human rights is stronger, however, and his ex-
planations of various systems of judicial review will enlighten those who 
have not kept up with the relevant literature. Especially for philosophers 
not trained as lawyers but interested in the problems of translating moral 
conclusions into legal norms, this is a valuable book.
Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics by Patrick Lee and 
Robert P. George. Cambridge University Press, 2008; viii + 222 pp. Cloth, 
$80.00.
DANIEL N. ROBINSON, Oxford University
In his attempt to “Newtonianize” what would now be called psychology, 
Locke famously reduced the contents of mental life to corpuscular entities 
(“simple ideas”) which, by a process of association, were melded into ever 
more complex ensembles. The source of the elementary ideas was compa-
rably elementary sensations. Locke’s related and further task was to rid 
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a science of human understanding of every vestige of the old substance-
theories still defended by the Cambridge Platonists just down the road. Of 
course, the self (mind; soul; spirit) was just the sort of ontological dangler 
that needed to be dispatched. Hence, Locke’s famous theory of personal 
identity as but the reach of consciousness back over remembered experi-
ences. If these could be transferred between a Prince and a cobbler, each 
of them would awaken, as Locke put it, the same man but not the same 
person. Along the way, Locke distinguished the things whose “essential” 
nature could and could not be known; the distinction being between their 
nominal and their real essence. The latter, in today’s vernacular, would be 
at the level of sub-particles inaccessible to experience, whereas the former 
would be classified by way of our merely conventional designations: man, 
horse, Pippin apple.
Over time, it became clear that this seemingly abstract metaphysical 
issue was alive with moral and legal conundrums. These were recognized 
soon after the publication of Locke’s Essay. Pope, Swift, and the other 
“Scriblerians” were quick to recognize the weird legal implications arising 
from a theory that confers a new personal identity with new sets of experi-
ences. But only in our own time have these anticipations ripened into seri-
ous and detailed examinations of just how personhood is to be understood 
and the ethical and political consequences arising from different positions 
on that fundamental question. Such a detailed examination is provided 
by Patrick Lee and Robert George in six tightly argued chapters equally 
informing in philosophy of mind, ethical theory, jurisprudence, and even 
the metaphysics of identity relations. 
Needless to say, in packing so much into a relatively brief treatise, the 
authors are surely excused for summarizing, but not always analyzing, core 
concepts at levels that would call for entire volumes. Thus, in considering at 
some length Derek Parfit’s influential work in the matter of personal identi-
ty, insufficient attention is paid to Parfit’s interesting (but I believe flawed) 
contention that the person-plus-self dyad enjoys no metaphysical advantage 
over a person minus self entity. Parfit’s seemingly more economical ontol-
ogy is thus not embarrassed by the consequences of a perfect duplication, 
though Lee and George must rule against such a duplicate withdrawing 
funds from the bank account of the original (p. 35). I should note that is-
sues arising from this distinction are not reducible to dualism-materialism 
controversies. To the extent that materialism can support some sort of per-
sonhood, it can equally well (poorly) support some sort of selfhood. 
The authors provide an especially perspicuous account and critique of 
hedonistic ethics, making good use of Aristotle in establishing that not ev-
erything desired is desirable. Variations on the “brain in a vat” scenario are 
advanced in support of the claim that there is more to fulfillment than the 
experience of pleasure. The research literature on intrinsic motivation is now 
robust and reasonably stable and might have been consulted to drive home 
the point that passive pleasures are quickly abandoned in favor of those we 
work to earn. Even without this support, the authors set down just the chal-
lenges that hedonistic theorists ignore or systematically misunderstand.
The chapter on abortion begins with the arresting question, “What is 
killed in an abortion?” The authors advance compelling, convincing ar-
guments to the effect that human embryonic and fetal life is complete as 
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an expression of human life, though not mature as a form of human life. 
Obviously, the embryo is a complete organism (p. 121). The maturation lead-
ing to neonatal life is governed by processes internal to the embryo. Hard 
cases (e.g., embryonic monozygotic twins) are seen to be rather soft cases 
once the assumptions of the skeptic are examined closely. After all, as the 
authors write, “In nature, determinate individuals split and generate new 
entities all the time . . . ” (p. 123). 
This part of the overall argument returns Lee and George to the conclu-
sions reached in the first chapter. Suppose one contends that the human 
fetus is a human being but not a human person, withholding the latter 
until there is evidence of reflective consciousness, self-awareness, and so 
on. On this account, there is a fetus that at a later date will be Mr. Smith, 
but now is something qualified as “human” and “in being” and, there-
fore, in some sense a human being. Later, something new arrives – Mr. 
Smith, a full-fledged person. As Lee and George make clear, only a very 
quirky mereological gambit can make this seem credible. How one goes 
about adding reflective consciousness to a (merely) biological system, the 
latter now metamorphosing into a person, is the sort of theory that gave 
alchemy a bad name.
The chapter on euthanasia, which includes considerations of suicide, 
would have been improved by considering in detail Hume’s challenge 
and then the Kantian perspective as a means by which to give moral solid-
ity to the authors’ notion of “intrinsic dignity.” Such dignity as might be 
accorded persons, at least on grounds not expressly religious, would seem 
to be tied to the possibilities immanent in rationality itself; thus, to termi-
nate rational life in the interest of a sensuous desire (termination of pain) 
is, to say no more, a bad bargain. This, at any rate, is surely an argument 
that might well have been developed in the chapter, even at the expense 
of various conjectures regarding the (arguable) criteria of brain death and 
the extent to which it should be dispositive.
The concluding chapter addresses the moral dimensions of sexuality 
and does so with care and concern. The authors recognize the powers of 
eros and understand that putting this aspect of life on the right track re-
quires more than scolding. At the bottom of their analysis, the authors 
caution against trading gold for brass. There is much more in the chap-
ter, with an entire section devoted to distinguishing between heterosexual 
and homosexual sexuality, the latter stripped of the moral validity associ-
ated with the possibility of procreation. On the offered analysis, only the 
procreative heterosexuality that takes place between loving spouses can 
“realize a common good rather than induce self-alienation or an illusory 
experience” (p. 217).
Only an extraterrestrial would expect anything less than cries of pro-
test once this book enters into the consciousness of today’s apologists. 
It would be surprising if those opposed to the central arguments were 
as respectful and systematic in their criticisms as Lee and George have 
been in challenging views different from their own. But, as the title of 
the work makes clear, what has long been an interesting if abstract set of 
metaphysical questions has now been absorbed into the political realities 
of our time, thus attracting many commentators foreign to philosophical 
discourse. May the games begin!
